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INTRODUCTION 
“For 217 years, through boom and bust, insurgency, civil war, and 
terrorist attack, this Court . . . has carefully and prudentially 
administered the Writ of Habeas Corpus to secure the rights of the 
individual against overreaching by the executive.”1  These words were 
written by Chief Judge Young of the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts when he recommended that the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit reverse the removal order entered 
against Frank Enwonwu, due to the likelihood that he would be 
tortured upon return to his native Nigeria.2  Despite this 
recommendation, the circuit court upheld the order to remove 
Enwonwu.3  Due to legislative changes to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) in recent years, a considerable risk exists with 
the current scheme for judicial review of alien removal orders that 
individuals, such as Enwonwu, will be ordered removed to countries 
where they face a threat of torture, persecution, and other forms of 
mistreatment.4  Most notably, the REAL ID Act of 2005 strips certain 
classes of aliens of the ability to seek habeas review.5  Since the Act’s 
passage, federal courts have avoided finding that it violates the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution.6  Instead, courts have found 
the Act to provide an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ 
of habeas corpus7 and, therefore, have concluded that the Act is not 
in violation of the Suspension Clause.8  These decisions have largely 
been based on the circuit courts’ own interpretations of the writ, 
since historically there has been little discussion of the writ by the 
Supreme Court.9 
                                                          
 1. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 42–43 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 2. Id. at 85. 
 3. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 4. See Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (finding that Enwonwu had sufficiently 
demonstrated that he would face a “danger of violent retribution” if he were to 
return to Nigeria). 
 5. See infra Part I.D (summarizing the provisions of the REAL ID Act). 
 6. See infra Part I.D (discussing courts’ responses to the passage of the REAL ID 
Act). 
 7. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (examining the circuit courts’ 
reasoning that the REAL ID Act provides a sufficient substitute for the writ and is 
therefore consistent with the Constitution). 
 8. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court 
precedent permitting a suspension of the writ so long as a substitute is provided that 
meets certain standards). 
 9. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (observing the limited Supreme 
Court jurisprudence concerning the writ, particularly in the context of executive 
detentions). 
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This elimination of habeas review has shaped the outcome of many 
aliens’ experiences in our justice system, including Frank Enwonwu.  
Enwonwu, a native of Nigeria, was arrested in 1986 upon arrival in 
the United States after customs officials discovered that he was 
carrying heroin.10  After agreeing to serve as a government informant 
for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enwonwu received 
a suspended sentence.11  He served as an informant for ten months,12 
after which he worked as a nurse assistant and a realtor.13 
In response to the 1996 amendments to the INA that retroactively 
classified aliens convicted of certain felonies as removable to their 
country of origin,14 Enwonwu was placed in removal proceedings.15  
The immigration judge (IJ), however, determined that it was “more 
likely than not” that Enwonwu would be tortured if he were sent back 
to Nigeria, given his role as an informant for the U.S. government.16  
Unbeknownst to Enwonwu,17 the government appealed that 
determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), who 
overturned the immigration judge’s decision and ordered Enwonwu’s 
removal in his absence.18  Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) arrested him in 2004,19 and on March 17, 2005, Enwonwu filed 
a habeas petition with the district court.20  Despite several days of 
evidentiary hearings and witness testimony,21 the district court was 
forced to transfer the case to the court of appeals in response to the 
REAL ID Act,22 enacted on May 11, 2005, which stripped the district 
                                                          
 10. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43–44 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 11. Id. at 47. 
 12. See id. at 47–49 (describing how Enwonwu provided the DEA with 
information concerning the drug trade in Nigeria and also served as a mole within 
the Nigerian community in the United States). 
 13. Id. at 49, 55. 
 14. See infra Part I.C (describing the changes made to the INA in the 1996 
amendments, particularly concerning alien removal orders). 
 15. Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 49. 
 16. See id. at 54–55 (relying on expert testimony concerning the 
“interrelationship” in Nigeria between drug traffickers, the military, and the 
government and on testimony of the DEA agent who had worked with Enwonwu). 
 17. See id. at 55 (observing that Enwonwu never received the notice of appeal 
because it was not properly addressed and that his attorney, who claimed he had not 
received it either, never notified him of the appeal). 
 18. Id. at 56 (rejecting the argument that Enwonwu’s cooperation with DEA 
would likely expose him to retribution in Nigeria, relying on the idea that a removal 
is not equivalent to torture condoned by a public official). 
 19. Id. at 55. 
 20. See id. at 56–57 (arguing that he was procedurally deprived of due process 
because of the lack of notice and substantively denied due process because a return 
to Nigeria would be a “government-created danger”). 
 21. Id. at 56–58. 
 22. Id. at 81 (noting that the court was ready but unable to render a decision). 
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courts of jurisdiction over alien removal orders.23  Nonetheless, in its 
order of transfer, the district court recommended that Enwonwu 
should be granted relief under the “state-created danger theory” 
because Enwonwu’s service as an informant, induced by the  
U.S. government, would likely lead to his torture upon return to 
Nigeria.24  The court of appeals, however, held that Enwonwu’s claims 
concerning a state-created danger and the constitutionality of the 
REAL ID Act were not actionable and remanded the case back to the 
BIA for further consideration of Enwonwu’s Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) claim.25  On remand, the BIA again ordered 
Enwonwu’s removal, finding him ineligible for CAT relief.26  
Enwonwu filed another petition for review in the court of appeals, 
but the court still upheld his removal order, finding that the BIA had 
engaged in a proper de novo review in reversing the IJ’s decision.27  
Frank Enwonwu now lives in a homeless shelter with his  
thirteen-year-old son and can be taken into custody and deported 
without any notice.28  Unfortunately, Enwonwu’s story is not unique.  
Despite the clear need for more expansive review than what the 
circuit courts can currently provide, many individuals have been 
prohibited from seeking habeas review since the REAL ID Act’s 
                                                          
 23. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (REAL ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106,  
119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 24. See Enwonwu, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (describing the government’s argument 
for Enwonwu’s removal as one that “shocks the conscience”). 
 25. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 29, 33, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (remanding 
on Enwonwu’s CAT Claim after finding that, with regards to Enwonwu’s state-created 
danger claim, aliens do not have a substantive due process right to not be removed 
from the country, and that the REAL ID Act could not be unconstitutional on the 
facts presented because Enwonwu received the same level of review at the court of 
appeals that he would have received through habeas review). 
 26. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 27. Id. at 16. 
 28. See Denise Lavoie, Drug Courier Helped in Sting, Feels Stung, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 
2008, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/jan/22/news/chi-informant_22 
jan22 (reporting that Enwonwu has had to spend five of the past eleven years in 
detention although he believed the United States would keep him safe when he 
agreed to be an informant); see also AMNESTY 133, AMNESTY INT’L, GROUP 133’S 
ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER FOR MARCH 2008, http://www.amnesty133.org/events/ 
news/2008/news_3.txt (noting the failed efforts to obtain relief for Enwonwu but 
hoping that, because Enwonwu has sole custody of his son, social services might 
block the deportation order). 
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passage.29  The circuit courts continue to uphold the Act based on the 
limited jurisprudence available concerning the writ.30 
All of this changed in 2008.  In Boumediene v. Bush,31 the Supreme 
Court provided the first extensive interpretation of the meaning and 
purpose of the Suspension Clause and the writ of habeas corpus.32  
The majority opinion also set forth an analytical approach for courts 
to undertake when determining whether a substitute for the writ is 
“adequate and effective.”33  Based on this new framework, this 
Comment argues that the REAL ID Act fails to provide an “adequate 
and effective” substitute for the writ because the current level of 
review does not allow the courts of appeals to correct the deficiencies 
of earlier proceedings. 
Part One of this Comment will examine the developments of the 
writ of habeas corpus throughout the history of the United States, 
beginning with the importance the Founding Fathers placed on the 
writ.  This section will also examine the recent changes in federal 
court review of alien removal orders, beginning with the 1996 
legislation and continuing with the REAL ID Act, along with the 
federal courts’ responses to those acts.  Part Two will then examine 
the majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, addressing the meaning 
and purpose that Justice Kennedy attached to the writ of habeas 
corpus and the analytical approach he set forth to determine if a 
substitute is “adequate and effective.”  Part Three will then analyze 
whether the current system for review of alien removal orders 
comports with the guidelines set forth by Justice Kennedy in 
Boumediene.  This section will draw comparisons between the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that the Court 
examined in Boumediene and the immigration hearings concerning 
alien removal orders.  This section will then contrast the level of 
review provided to courts of appeals when reviewing alien removal 
orders with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s level 
of review over the CSRTs’ decisions.  Finally, this section will examine 
                                                          
 29. Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485  F.3d 193, 196 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining 
how district courts were required upon passage of the REAL ID Act to transfer 
pending habeas petitions for review of removal orders to the circuit courts). 
 30. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (observing the limited Supreme 
Court jurisprudence concerning the writ, particularly in the context of executive 
detentions). 
 31. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 32. See infra Part II.B (describing the analytical approach set forth by the Court in 
Boumediene to determine the quality and sufficiency of a substitute for the writ);  
infra notes 38, 40-41, 140 and accompanying text (recounting the imprecise and 
vague treatment of the writ by federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court 
before Boumediene). 
 33. Id. 
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the courts of appeals’ decisions since the passage of the REAL ID Act 
to determine whether the current system provides for adequate 
review in light of Boumediene.  Part Four recommends the restoration 
of the right of aliens to seek habeas review of their removal orders 
due to the deficiencies in the earlier proceedings and the lack of 
“adequate and effective” review in the courts of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Development of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
The Founding Fathers placed considerable importance on the writ 
of habeas corpus when drafting the Suspension Clause of the 
Constitution,34 which provides that the “Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”35  As evidence 
of its importance, the writ was one of the few individual rights set 
forth in the Constitution prior to the Bill of Rights.36  Alexander 
Hamilton described the writ as a “bulwark” against arbitrary 
prosecutions and punishments.37 
Despite the significance of the writ, courts have struggled in 
defining its exact scope and purpose.38  Early on, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the writ as being in “the nature of a writ of error” with the 
                                                          
 34. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 564–66 (2002) (noting that the Framers 
understood the “importance of habeas corpus as a security for physical liberty”).  
While there is not considerable information concerning the reason why the final 
version of the Clause was used over others, it is clear that the limitation on 
Congress’s power to suspend the writ was uncontroversial.  Id. at 566.  In fact, three 
state delegations at the Constitutional Convention dissented from the final vote on 
the Clause because they did not feel that Congress should ever be able to suspend the 
writ.  Id.; see also 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE  
§ 104.04(2)(a) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2008) (“The right to habeas corpus is rooted 
in the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause.  It has a pre-eminent role in our 
constitutional system; its scope, flexibility, and capacity to reach all manner of illegal 
detentions have been emphasized and jealously guarded.”). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 36. Neuman, supra note 34, at 567. 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *438 
(1765)). 
 38. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future:  Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1469 (1997) (finding that 
both the litigation and history of habeas corpus “suggest[s] that precision in defining 
the scope of [the writ] will be unattainable”); cf. Jill M. Pfenning, Inadequate and 
Ineffective:  Congress Suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Noncitizens Challenging 
Removal Orders by Failing to Provide a Way to Introduce Evidence, 31 VT. L. REV. 735, 741 
(2007) (discussing the “debate” as to the scope of habeas review in the context of an 
alien challenging a removal order and finding that it was generally understood as a 
means of challenging the “legality of the detention”). 
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purpose of examining the legality of the detention.39  Later opinions 
by federal courts limited the scope of the writ to examining due 
process violations or “violation[s] of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”40  Despite the frequency with which the 
federal courts have addressed the writ, any discussion of its scope and 
purpose has been limited.41  The Supreme Court has made clear, 
however, that Congress can suspend the writ so long as it substitutes 
another form of review that is “neither inadequate nor ineffective to 
test the legality of a person’s detention.”42  In addition, the limited 
discussion of the writ has largely dealt with its use in the context of 
state court convictions with little attention directed at habeas review 
of executive detentions.43  While the focus on state court convictions 
is important, the primary historical purpose of the writ was to protect 
against unlawful executive detentions.44 
B. Importance of the Writ in Immigration Law 
The writ of habeas corpus has “played a vital role” in immigration 
law as a means for aliens to challenge their removal orders.45   
                                                          
 39. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (discussing the writ’s 
history in England). 
 40. 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 21 (4th ed. 2001) (citation omitted).  Hertz and Liebman outline the 
various enumerations the Supreme Court gave to the writ, including language that 
would end up being used in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  Id. 
 41. See id. at 6–9, 18–23 (explaining that, throughout the history of the writ in the 
United States, the Supreme Court has often used “one- or two-word labels,” such as a 
“civil remedy” and a “clearly appellate” process, which have sometimes been 
inconsistent and controversial when describing the scope of the writ, while also using 
“broad rhetoric” to describe the purpose of the writ, ranging from proclaiming the 
writ to be “in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the 
commitment” to a “remedy whose most basic traditions and purposes are to avoid a 
grievous wrong—holding a person in custody in violation of the Constitution” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 42. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); see United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (discussing the adequacy and effectiveness of an alternative to 
habeas corpus). 
 43. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 
Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1965 (2000) (critiquing the emphasis on 
state court convictions review, where “[t]he primary focus has been federalism, not 
separation of powers”). 
 44. See id. (explaining that the writ was meant to protect against both “executive 
detention without legal authority and executive detention in violation of legal 
restrictions”). 
 45. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at 1769 (acknowledging the Supreme 
Court’s view that “[b]efore and after the enactment in 1875 of the first statute 
regulating immigration . . . federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was regularly invoked 
on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context” (quoting INS v.  
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001))).  Moreover, “[u]ntil the enactment of the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole means by which an alien could test the 
legality of his or her deportation order was by bringing a habeas corpus action in 
district court.”  Id.; see GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a) (“[H]abeas 
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Even prior to receiving statutory authority from Congress, federal 
courts consistently heard habeas petitions from aliens concerning 
both constitutional and non-constitutional claims.46  In 1953, the 
Supreme Court in Heikkila v. Barber47 recognized the constitutional 
right of aliens to petition the federal courts for review of immigration 
decisions.48  However, the Court clarified that the scope of such 
review was limited to due process requirements, which is “very 
different from applying a statutory standard of review, [such as] 
deciding on ‘the whole record’ whether there is substantial evidence 
to support administrative findings of fact.”49 
The 1961 amendments to the INA provided the next major 
development in review of alien removal orders by stipulating that the 
courts of appeals had “sole and exclusive” authority to review removal 
orders.50  While review was typically limited to the courts of appeals, 
aliens had numerous assurances that they would receive adequate 
review.51  Additionally, aliens subject to removal and simultaneously 
detained were still allowed to petition a district court for habeas 
review, rather than turning to the courts of appeals on direct review.52  
Habeas review was also available for “unusual cases,” where a removal 
                                                          
corpus is the historic—and most fundamental—basis for judicial review of 
immigration orders.”).  The 1996 legislation consolidated “exclusion” and 
“deportation” into one category entitled “removal”; for the purposes of this 
Comment, the term removal will be used.  See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 743 
(explaining the changes made in the 1996 legislation). 
 46. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(b) (noting that despite the 
1891 and 1917 Immigration Acts, which were intended to prohibit judicial review of 
aliens’ petitions, courts continued to hear such claims, indicating that the right to 
such review was constitutionally based); see also Neuman, supra note 43, at 1966 
(observing that prior to congressional regulation of immigration, federal courts 
utilized the writ in examining the lawfulness of removing various groups of aliens, 
including enemy aliens and those aliens accused of committing a crime). 
 47. 345 U.S. 229 (1953). 
 48. Id. at 237; see also David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act:  Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 75, 79 (2006–07) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding that 
habeas review was the sole means of review for aliens because the Immigration Act of 
1917 precluded any other form of review of immigration decisions). 
 49. Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236. 
 50. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53 (repealed 
1996); see also McConnell, supra note 48, at 80-81 (describing the judicial review 
scheme set up by the 1961 INA as “more closely resembling” the review found in the 
Administrative Procedure Act than habeas review, which was narrower in scope 
under the Heikkila decision). 
 51. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 81 (summarizing the provisions of the 1961 
INA, including the ability of aliens to file for review up to ninety days after the final 
removal order was entered and the authority of the courts of appeals to review the 
administrative record, discretionary decisions, and factual determinations under 
varying levels of review). 
 52. See id. at 81-82, 82 n.37 (quoting the INA provision stating that “any alien 
held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review 
thereof by habeas corpus proceedings” (citation omitted)). 
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order was necessitated by various circumstances, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel.53  Aliens were even allowed to file a second 
habeas petition in certain situations.54  This system of judicial review 
remained in place until Congress took action in 1996.55 
C. 1996 Amendments to the INA and the Supreme Court’s  
Response in INS v. St. Cyr 
Congress made drastic changes to the procedure for judicial review 
of alien removal orders in two different 1996 acts.56  Initially, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) repealed 
section 106(a)(10) of the INA, which had allowed habeas review for 
deportable aliens being detained.57  AEDPA also added a provision to 
the INA, which prohibited any judicial review over deportations of 
aliens convicted of certain crimes.58 
Within the same year, Congress again altered judicial review of 
removal orders in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),59 which repealed all of section 106 of the 
INA and replaced it with section 242, part of which applied 
retroactively.60  This new section provided that aliens only had thirty 
days to petition for review and that review of all removal orders would 
take place in the court of appeals in the circuit in which the IJ had 
                                                          
 53. See Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future?  Lessons Learned from Litigation 
Over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2006-07) 
(finding several situations where the circuit courts found habeas review available, 
including:  ineffective assistance of counsel, an emergency stay of deportation while 
an appeal was pending, and abuse of discretion by the agency). 
 54. See id. (noting the availability of second habeas petitions when information 
became available that was not presented at the earlier proceeding or if earlier 
proceedings provided a remedy that was “inadequate or ineffective”). 
 55. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of 
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 961 (1998) (explaining that the 104th Congress passed 
new legislation motivated by a frustration with what it perceived as “enforcement 
inefficiencies” with the INS). 
 56. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Neuman, supra note 55, at 961 
(indicating that the 1996 acts would, “if taken literally, create unprecedented 
restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus to aliens being removed from the 
United States”). 
 57. AEDPA § 401(e). 
 58. Id. § 401(a). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 60. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(3)(a) (noting that section 242(g) 
of  IIRIRA, which limited judicial review of certain immigration issues, was “expressly 
made to apply to ‘past, pending or future exclusion, deportation, or removal 
proceedings under [the] Act’” (citation omitted)). 
 2009] ACCURACY OR FAIRNESS? 1621 
issued the removal order.61  IIRIRA also further limited the scope of 
judicial review by providing that aliens convicted of serious criminal 
offenses would have no review of their removal order.62 
Numerous issues immediately arose concerning the 
constitutionality of these provisions with regard to the Suspension 
Clause,63 resulting in a surge of litigation.64  The main issue that arose 
from this litigation centered on the availability of judicial review for 
those aliens convicted of criminal offenses.65  While the Acts made 
clear that direct review to the courts of appeals was unavailable for 
aliens convicted of certain crimes, it was unclear whether Congress 
had intended to eliminate habeas review as well since there was no 
explicit reference to the writ.66  In resolving that issue in INS v.  
St. Cyr,67 the Supreme Court held that habeas review by the federal 
district courts was still available because Congress had not provided a 
“clear, unambiguous, and express statement of [its] intent” to repeal 
habeas review.68  The Court in St. Cyr, however, did not undertake to 
examine the scope of habeas review in making its decision.69   
In response to the Supreme Court’s indication of what was required 
                                                          
 61. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2). 
 62. Id. § 309(c)(4)(G); see also McConnell, supra note 48, at 86-87 (explaining 
that prior to these acts, “aliens could file review petitions in the courts of appeals and 
detained aliens could challenge their deportation orders in habeas corpus 
proceedings”).  The IIRIRA provision provided a similar list to the provisions in 
AEDPA of offenses that qualified as a serious criminal act, thus barring review.   
Id. at 87.  The provision included such crimes as “aggravated felonies, controlled 
substance and firearms offenses, multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, and 
other miscellaneous offenses.”  Id. 
 63. See generally Neuman, supra note 55, at 966-67 (describing the issues that arose 
in response to the 1996 acts, including the extent to which the bar to review of a 
deportation resulting from criminal conduct permitted the courts to review whether 
the conduct truly warranted deportation). 
 64. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 86, 88 (noting that despite Congress’s desire 
to “streamline and expedite” judicial review of aliens’ claims, considerable litigation 
arose in response to the 1996 acts). 
 65. See Neuman, supra note 43, at 1986-87 (observing that IIRIRA presented an 
issue as to whether the “rule [was] explicit enough to preclude habeas 
jurisdiction, . . . and potentially whether such preclusion [was] constitutional”). 
 66. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 87, 89 (reporting on the circuit court split 
that developed over whether habeas review was available to criminal aliens in light of 
AEDPA and IIRIRA).  The Government maintained the position that habeas review 
was no longer available.  See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(3)(a) (noting 
that, because the 1996 acts did not “explicitly repeal[] or even address[] the 
traditional habeas corpus review provided by statute,” the Government argued it was 
repealed implicitly). 
 67. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 68. See id. at 314 (finding that, if the Court were to rule otherwise, there would be 
no forum for review, which would raise Suspension Clause concerns and, therefore, 
the Court would read the acts to be constitutional). 
 69. See id. at 301 n.13 (explaining that “[t]he fact that th[e] Court would be 
required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in 
and of itself a reason” to find habeas review still available after the 1996 acts). 
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to effectuate a repeal of habeas review, Congress acted again in 2005 
to make its intent to repeal habeas review perfectly clear.70 
D. The REAL ID Act Suspends Habeas Review of Alien Removal Orders 
In the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress unambiguously eliminated 
habeas review of alien removal orders.71  Congress admitted that the 
Act was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr.72  
Congress believed the decision had created “anomalies” in the 
judicial review scheme for alien removal orders73 and was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the 1996 acts.74 
In the cases that have arisen since the REAL ID Act, review of alien 
removal orders is only available in the courts of appeals and is limited 
to constitutional and legal claims.75  In addition, the REAL ID Act 
maintains a thirty-day deadline for filing petitions for review,76 limits 
courts of appeals’ review to the administrative record,77 and does not 
allow the courts to hear new evidence.78  Despite the REAL ID Act’s 
                                                          
 70. See McConnell, supra note 48, at 105 (explaining that the congressional 
repeal of habeas review of removal orders in the REAL ID Act was a direct response 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr and other decisions in which the Court 
had not found congressional intent to be sufficiently explicit and unambiguous to 
justify a finding that habeas review was completely barred). 
 71. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(B)(5), 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see McConnell, supra note 48, at 105 (suggesting that 
congressional intent to repeal habeas review could not have been clearer).  Congress 
did attempt to ensure that there were no Suspension Clause concerns by adding a 
section stating that “[n]othing [in this Act] shall be construed as precluding review 
of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed 
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”  REAL ID Act  
§ 106(a)(1)(A)(iii).   
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 109–72, at 173 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240. 
 73. See id. at 174 (arguing that St. Cyr gave criminal aliens more review than non-
criminal aliens and created confusion as to which court should review immigration 
cases).  Congress had been very critical of the system that resulted from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in St. Cyr.  See Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review 
After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 136 n.11 (2006-07) 
(acknowledging Congress’s concern that lawyers and courts would have difficulty 
litigating in such a system). 
 74. See id. at 172 (admitting that the purpose of the 1996 acts was to limit judicial 
review of alien removal orders, albeit in an effort to streamline the process). 
 75. Id. at 174 (noting that habeas review is not intended to address non-
constitutional discretionary or factual issues). 
 76. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (contending that, while the thirty-day 
limit also existed with the 1996 acts, constitutional issues were avoided because the 
petition for review was only the primary, but not the sole, means of review). 
 77. See id. at 128 (noting that previously habeas review had served as a safety net 
for situations where factual issues needed to be addressed that were not included in 
the administrative record). 
 78. See Neuman, supra note 71, at 145 (maintaining that the adequacy of the 
review depends on the ability of the court to “make necessary inquiries”).  Since the 
1996 legislation, the courts of appeals are also not authorized to remand to the 
administrative agencies for more evidence gathering.  See id. at 146. 
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limitations on review, courts of appeals have upheld the Act as 
constitutional by finding that it provides an “adequate and effective” 
substitute for the writ through direct review to the courts of appeals.79 
E. Executive Attempts to Limit Review at the Administrative Level 
As Congress attempted to limit review of alien removal orders, the 
executive branch instituted streamlining procedures at the BIA, an 
“administrative tribunal” of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that 
hears appeals from the immigration courts.80  These measures were 
implemented to resolve the tremendous backlog of appeals.81  
Beginning in 1999, the DOJ instituted changes in the appeals 
procedure, one of which authorized the Chairman of the BIA to 
define categories of cases that could appropriately be heard by a 
single board member instead of the usual three-member panel.82   
The streamlining continued in 2002 when the Chairman added two 
more large categories to those appeals that could be decided by a 
single board member.83  The Chairman continued adding categories 
until essentially all appeals concerning removal could be heard by a 
single board member; hearings by three-member panels have become 
the exception, not the rule.84  These single board members are also 
authorized to affirm decisions made by an IJ without issuing an 
opinion.85  The streamlining measures also limit the scope of the 
BIA’s review in examining factual findings of the IJs.86  Additionally, 
                                                          
 79. See, e.g., Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“[O]ther Circuits, with which [this court] now join[s], have determined that the 
provision of the REAL ID Act at issue here is not unconstitutional because  
‘it provides, through review by a federal court of appeals, an adequate and effective 
remedy to test the legality of an alien’s detention.’” (citation omitted)).  In this 
decision, the Second Circuit joined the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in 
holding that the REAL ID Act was constitutional.  See id. (citing Mohammed v. 
Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 
(9th Cir. 2006); Alexandre v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 80. See generally John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 17 n.16 
(2006-07) (listing the various decisions that the BIA reviews in addition to alien 
removal orders). 
 81. See id. at 17-18, 18 n.18 (noting the increase in the 1990s of appeals of IJ 
decisions to the BIA with the total number of appeals before the BIA reaching almost 
30,000 in 2000, compared to less than 3000 in 1984 (citation omitted)). 
 82. Id. at 18. 
 83. See id. at 19 (allowing single board members to hear appeals “involving claims 
for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief,” in addition to “cases involving claims for 
suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal”). 
 84. Id. at 19. 
 85. Id. at 18.  Such decisions lacking a written opinion are called affirmances 
without opinions (“AWOs”).  Id. 
 86. See id. at 19 (explaining that the BIA, which used to have de novo review over 
factual findings, must now defer to factual findings of the IJ “unless they are clearly 
erroneous,” and it can no longer engage in any fact finding itself). 
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the executive branch reduced the number of members on the BIA 
from twenty-three to eleven.87 
While the aforementioned changes were implemented to reduce 
the BIA’s backlog, these measures have led to a 970 percent increase 
in the number of appeals to the federal courts; any reduction in the 
backlog at the BIA has merely been transferred to the federal courts.88  
The resulting increase in appeals has turned the courts of appeals 
into a “major focal point for immigration litigation,”89 despite the 
limited review available to aliens in these courts.90  Regardless of the 
narrow scope of review at both the BIA and the courts of appeals, the 
courts of appeals have upheld the REAL ID Act’s repeal of habeas 
review, finding the current level of review “adequate and effective.”91 
II. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH SETS FORTH THE SUPREME COURT’S 
APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF  
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
The Supreme Court expanded its explanation of the writ of habeas 
corpus in its 2008 decision Boumediene v. Bush.92  The majority opinion 
by Justice Kennedy extended the writ of habeas corpus to the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.93  More importantly, however, the 
                                                          
 87. Id.  While the purpose of decreasing the number of members on the BIA was 
to encourage “cohesiveness and collegiality,” id., it seems “perverse” to do so when 
the BIA was facing such a tremendous backlog.  Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls:  
How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration 
Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 44 n.20 (2006-07).  Benson also 
notes that the members removed from the BIA were those most likely to dissent or 
“write concurring opinions that suggested alternative legal analysis.”  Id.  At the time 
this article went to print, the BIA has been authorized to increase its size to fifteen 
board members, although vacancies still exist.  United States Department of Justice, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited July 29, 2009). 
 88. See Benson, supra note 87, at 47 (describing the streamlining as having 
created an “explosion” of work in the federal courts).  While it remains unclear what 
exactly motivated the increase in appeals to the circuit courts, whether it be a lack of 
faith in the BIA’s procedure or some other factor, the link between those procedural 
changes and the surge in litigation in the courts of appeals is clear.  Id. 
     89. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 35 (noting the indisputable link between the 
procedural changes at the BIA and the resulting surge in litigation in the courts of 
appeals).      
 90. See supra Parts I.C-D (describing the legislative changes to judicial review of 
alien removal orders). 
 91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (acknowledging the circuit courts 
that have upheld the REAL ID Act). 
 92. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 93. Id. at 2262 (holding that “the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.  
If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us, 
Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”). 
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Supreme Court enunciated what it had failed to explain in St. Cyr.94  
For the first time, the Supreme Court set forth its interpretation of 
the meaning and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
analysis to undertake in determining its scope.95 
A. Background and Summary of Boumediene v. Bush 
Boumediene involved a several-year struggle for the detainees at 
Guantanamo to secure the right to habeas review of their Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearings, which had determined that 
they were enemy combatants.96  Though the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 (MCA) eliminated habeas review of the CSRT hearings,97 the 
Government argued that the Suspension Clause had not been 
violated because the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) created a 
constitutionally sufficient substitute for the writ by allowing direct 
review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.98   
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the MCA 
was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ because direct review 
was not a constitutionally sufficient substitute.99 
                                                          
 94. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in St. Cyr did 
not attempt to define the scope of habeas review). 
 95. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262-74 (discussing whether Congress had 
provided an adequate substitute for the writ since it had removed habeas review in 
the Military Commissions Act (MCA)). 
 96. See id. at 2240-42 (outlining the procedural history of the case).  See generally 
Carrie Newton Lyons et al., International Legal Developments in Review:  2007, Public 
International Law, National Security:  Supreme Court Again to Consider Guantanamo 
Detainees, 42 INT’L LAW. 811, 812 (2008) (noting that Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) in response to Rasul v. Bush, which extended habeas 
protections to aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay (citations omitted)).  “[I]n June 
2006, the Supreme Court responded again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, holding that the 
DTA did not strip federal courts of jurisdiction over pending habeas petitions from 
detainees.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “As a response, Congress and the executive 
branch passed the [MCA],” which explicitly stripped the federal courts of the 
authority to hear habeas claims.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2635 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).   
 98. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.  The DTA states that: 
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an [enemy combatant] . . . 
shall be limited to the consideration of:  (i) whether the status determination 
of the [CSRT] . . . was consistent with the standards and procedures 
specified by the Secretary of Defense . . . and (ii) to the extent the 
Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of 
such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with 
the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 
2739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 5, 10, 15, 16, 28, 37, 41, 42, and 
50 U.S.C.). 
 99. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274. 
 1626 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1611 
B. The Analytical Approach Established in Boumediene to Determine 
What Constitutes an “Adequate and Effective” Substitute  
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Despite finding that a constitutionally sufficient substitute had not 
been provided, the majority in Boumediene did not set forth a clear 
test for determining when a substitute for the writ would be 
sufficient.100  Instead, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
explained that the writ is an “adaptable remedy” whose exact scope 
will change depending on the circumstances.101  Due to this 
adaptability, Kennedy proffered only two requirements that a 
substitute for the writ must provide:  a “meaningful opportunity” for 
any detained person to “demonstrate that he is being held pursuant 
to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation of [the] law’”102 and 
the ability of a reviewing court to order the release of the detained 
person.103 
Beyond those requirements, the scope of habeas review depends 
on the nature of the earlier proceedings.104  To illustrate this point, 
Justice Kennedy compared the writ in the context of review of 
executive detentions to its use in reviewing state court criminal 
convictions.105  In examining the common law history of the writ, 
Kennedy noted that “pretrial and noncriminal detention[s]” 
appeared to receive the most extensive habeas review.106  As Kennedy 
explained:   
A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial 
hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and 
                                                          
 100. See id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
“replac[ing] a review system designed by the people’s representatives with a set of 
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future date”). 
 101. See id. at 2266-67 (majority opinion) (explaining why the majority opinion 
did not provide a “comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate 
substitute for habeas corpus”).  This explanation of the writ as adaptable is consistent 
with prior Supreme Court decisions.  See Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345,  
349–50 (1973).  For instance, in Jones v. Cunningham, the Court stated that the writ  
“is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”  371 U.S. 236, 
243 (1963).  In Harris v. Nelson, the Court explained that, due to the nature of the 
writ, it must be “administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that 
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.”  See 394 U.S. 286, 
291 (1969) (describing that the purpose of the writ, in protecting against all illegal 
detention, requires it to be able “to cut through barriers of form and procedural 
mazes”). 
 102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266 (citation omitted). 
 103. Id. (noting, however, that the release of an individual does not have to be the 
“exclusive remedy[,]” nor is it always the most appropriate one). 
 104. Id. at 2268. 
 105. Id. at 2267–69. 
 106. See id. at 2267 (explaining that the more extensive habeas review was due to 
“little or no previous judicial review of the cause for detention”). 
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committed to procedures designed to ensure its own 
independence.  These dynamics are not inherent in executive 
detention orders . . . .  In this context the need for habeas corpus is 
more urgent.107 
In light of this difference in the scope of review, it was particularly 
important to the Boumediene majority that, even in the context of state 
court convictions, there were clear limits on the ability to 
circumscribe habeas review.  For instance, in Swain v. Pressley108 and 
United States v. Hayman,109 the Court’s leading cases concerning 
habeas substitutes for state court convictions, the majorities stressed 
that the substitutes were not “intended to circumscribe habeas 
review.”110  Additionally, in upholding the substitutes, the Court in 
both cases relied heavily on the existence of a savings clause in each 
statute that permitted habeas review if the substitute proved 
inadequate.111 
The majority in Boumediene also established that a due process 
analysis does not end the inquiry into the constitutionality of the 
substitute.112  As the Court noted, in the context of state court 
convictions, both Swain and Hayman established that the writ is 
relevant even when a person is detained after a criminal trial that was 
conducted in accordance with the Bill of Rights.113  In explaining the 
need to go beyond a due process analysis, Kennedy described habeas 
review as a “collateral process” that is not “subordinat[e]” to the 
original proceeding.114 
Beyond these general principles, the majority made clear that the 
sufficiency of any substitute for the writ will be determined on a  
                                                          
 107. Id. at 2269. 
 108. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). 
 109. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
 110. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2264-66 (finding that the purpose and effect of 
the statutes involved in both cases was intended only to expedite post conviction 
review, not to “frustrate” it). 
 111. Id. at 2265-66. 
 112. See id. at 2270 (explaining that “[e]ven when the procedures authorizing 
detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the 
writ relevant”); see also Neuman, supra note 43, at 1965 (arguing that the “writ [is] not 
directed solely against detention that violates constitutional rights”).  Professor 
Neuman supports the argument that the writ goes beyond a constitutional protection 
by pointing out that “the United States inherited habeas corpus from the English 
legal system, which had no separate category of constitutional error.”  Id. 
 113. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270. 
 114. See id. (“Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists . . . to ‘cut through all 
forms and go to the very tissue of the structure.  It comes in from the outside, not in 
subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved 
[sic] opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.’” (quoting 
Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
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case-by-case analysis.115  The initial proceedings must first be 
examined in order to identify any potential issues or problems that 
arise based on both their structure and overall nature.116  The analysis 
then turns to the reviewing court to determine whether the substitute 
provides adequate review given any deficiencies in the previous 
hearings.117 
C. Application of Boumediene’s New Analytical Approach  
to the Detainees at Guantanamo 
After setting forth this approach to determining whether a 
substitute satisfies the Suspension Clause, the majority found that, in 
light of the proceedings and nature of the CSRTs,118 the DTA did not 
provide an “adequate and effective” substitute.119  In examining the 
CSRTs, the Court was especially concerned with the “considerable 
risk of error” in the factual findings, even when the parties fully 
adhered to proper procedures.120  Considering that a mistake may 
lead to the detention of an innocent person for an indefinite period 
of time, the high risk of error provoked heightened concern for the 
constitutionality of the substitute.121  Therefore, the Court held that, 
in order “to function as an effective and proper remedy,” the 
reviewing court must be able to correct any factual errors.122   
This would include some ability “to assess the sufficiency of the 
Government’s evidence against the detainee” and the ability to 
introduce and consider exculpatory evidence not admitted at the 
CSRT hearing.123 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 2266, 2270. 
 116. See id. at 2266-68 (describing the difference in the scope of review depending 
on whether the detention is based on a criminal conviction emanating from a court 
or an executive detention). 
 117. See id. at 2269-74 (determining whether the DTA provides adequate review in 
light of the circumstances at the CSRTs). 
 118. Id. at 2269 (noting numerous deficiencies including the detainee’s difficulty 
in rebutting the Government’s claim that he is an enemy combatant, the “limited 
means to find or present evidence,” and the lack of counsel). 
 119. Id. at 2272-74 (finding that the court of appeals cannot order the detainee 
released even if it finds that detention is not justified).  The court is only allowed to 
examine the standards and procedures of the military commission and cannot 
engage in any fact finding nor allow the detainee to present exculpatory evidence 
that was not available during the earlier proceedings.  Id. 
 120. Id. at 2270. 
 121. Id. at 2270-71; cf. id. at 2279 (Souter, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
dissenting Justices for not appreciating the length of time the detainees had been at 
Guantanamo, which, for some, had already reached six years). 
 122. Id. at 2270 (majority opinion) (noting that habeas petitioners in federal 
courts traditionally have been able to submit additional evidence to the reviewing 
court, even in the state court conviction context). 
 123. Id. 
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It was, therefore, not difficult for the majority to find the DTA an 
inadequate substitute for the writ.124  First, under the DTA, the court 
of appeals did not have the power to order the release of the 
detainee,125 nor could it make the necessary factual findings.126  
Additionally, unlike the statutes in both Swain and Hayman,127 neither 
the DTA nor the MCA contained a savings clause to permit habeas 
review should the “alternative process prove[] inadequate or 
ineffective.”128  In further contrast to the statutes in Swain and 
Hayman, which were created to streamline judicial review,129 the DTA 
and MCA were intended to limit judicial review of the detainee’s 
petitions.130  Based on these characteristics of the judicial review 
scheme set up in the DTA, the Court found that the DTA did not 
provide an adequate substitute, and the MCA consequently was an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.131 
D. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent Arguing for a Due Process Analysis 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts approached his analysis of the 
MCA from an opposing perspective, arguing that the Court cannot 
reach its conclusion without first determining whether the CSRTs 
comport with the Due Process Clause.132  This approach, however, 
stems from a drastically different understanding of the writ.133  
                                                          
 124. Id. at 2274. 
 125. Id. at 2271. 
 126. Id. at 2271-74 (observing that the Court of Appeals was confined to reviewing 
the record from the CSRT and could not provide the detainees with an opportunity 
to introduce new exculpatory evidence).  While the detainee could request a new 
CSRT hearing if exculpatory material became available after the initial hearing, the 
Court found this insufficient to allow new evidence introduced because the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense has complete discretion in granting a new hearing, and the 
detainee has no opportunity to challenge the denial of a new hearing.  Id. at 2273. 
 127. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (observing that the statutes 
involved in both cases contained a savings clause that permitted habeas review if 
direct review proved inadequate or ineffective). 
 128. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265-66. 
 129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing how both statutes were 
intended to expedite judicial review). 
 130. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265. 
 131. See id. at 2275-76 (explaining that the Court was only holding 
unconstitutional section 7 of the MCA, which barred habeas review for the detainees; 
the DTA and the CSRT process would still remain intact, and the only difference in 
the judicial review scheme would be the opportunity for the detainees to seek habeas 
review). 
 132. See id. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Because the majority refuses to 
assess whether the CSRTs comport with the Constitution, it ends up razing a system 
of collateral review that it admits may in fact satisfy the Due Process Clause and be 
‘structurally sound.’”). 
 133. See generally Neuman, supra note 43, at 1964-65 (explaining that judicial 
review in the context of executive detention can be examined from three 
overlapping perspectives:  “the Article I prohibition against suspension of the writ of 
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Roberts found the writ to solely protect an individual’s due process 
right to a fair hearing.134  Under Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow 
approach, the CSRTs comported with the rules by which they were 
bound135 and provided the detainees a “constitutionally adequate 
opportunity to contest their detentions.”136  In contrast, the majority 
based its interpretation of the writ on the Suspension Clause and 
therefore found the scope of habeas review to be much broader.137  
The majority found that the purpose of the writ was not only to 
ensure fair procedures, but also to provide protections against 
detentions based on inaccurate determinations.138  This approach is 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, which has “consistently 
rejected interpretations of the [writ] that would suffocate [it] in 
stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of 
arcane and scholastic procedural requirements.”139 
III. APPLYING BOUMEDIENE’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR HABEAS REVIEW 
INDICATES THAT THE REAL ID ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE  
“ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE” REVIEW 
Since Boumediene offers the Supreme Court’s first extensive 
discussion of the Suspension Clause,140 it necessarily encourages an 
                                                          
habeas corpus, the vesting of judicial power in the federal courts under Article III, or 
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against deprivation of liberty without due process 
of law”).  Professor Neuman, in support of the majority in Boumediene, argues that the 
Suspension Clause must drive the analysis of judicial review of executive detentions 
and that Article III and the Due Process Clause must be read in light of this 
prohibition against suspending the writ of habeas corpus.  Id. 
 134. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Habeas is most 
fundamentally a procedural right . . . .  The critical threshold question in these cases, 
prior to any inquiry about the writ’s scope, is whether the system the political 
branches designed protects whatever rights the detainees may possess.”); see also 
Benson, supra note 87, at 60 (noting that due process, under current case law, may 
not require review of immigration hearings by an Article III court). 
 135. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2287-89 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the 
rights detainees possess at their CSRT hearings, including the right to examine 
witnesses and call witnesses of their own). 
 136. Id. at 2284. 
 137. Id. at 2244 (majority opinion). 
 138. See id. at 2266 (“We do consider it uncontroversial, however, that the 
privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or 
interpretation of relevant law.’” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))). 
 139. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973). 
 140. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263 (explaining that “[o]ur case law does not 
contain extensive discussion of standards defining suspension of the writ or of 
circumstances under which suspension has occurred”); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 
supra note 40, at 6-7 (noting that the extent of Supreme Court treatment of the writ 
was largely limited to “one- to two-word labels”).  Justice Kennedy proffered an 
explanation for this absence of analysis of the writ as due to the fact that  
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examination of other forums where the writ has traditionally been 
employed to ensure that the right to habeas review is protected in 
accordance with the Court’s understanding of the writ.141  
Considering the extensive legislative changes to judicial review of 
alien removal orders that have occurred in recent years,142 the current 
system under the REAL ID Act should be reexamined using the 
analytical approach introduced by the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene.143 
A. Boumediene’s Analytical Approach Should Be Applied to the  
REAL ID Act to Determine Its Constitutionality 
In light of the similar judicial review scheme that Congress 
established for both Guantanamo detentions and alien removal 
orders,144 the analysis that the Court established in Boumediene should 
be applied to the REAL ID Act’s judicial review scheme for alien 
removal orders.  Even if differences exist between the two judicial 
review procedures, the analytical approach set forth in Boumediene is 
still appropriate because the Court indicated that its analysis was not 
limited to habeas review for Guantanamo detainees and should 
extend to other forms of executive detention.145  First, the Court 
stressed that judicial review is “most pressing” in the context of 
executive detentions because, unlike state court convictions, such 
detentions are not the result of hearings before “disinterested” 
tribunals.146  Additionally, even in the context of state court 
convictions, the Court indicated that it would still apply the analysis 
                                                          
“Congress has taken [care] throughout our Nation’s history to preserve the writ and 
its function.  Indeed, most of the major legislative enactments pertaining to habeas 
corpus have acted not to contract the writ’s protection but to expand it or to hasten 
resolution of prisoners’ claims.”  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263. 
 141. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”). 
 142. See supra Part I.C–D (describing the changes to judicial review of alien 
removal orders beginning with the 1996 amendments to the INA and culminating 
with the elimination of habeas review in the REAL ID Act of 2005). 
 143. Cf. Neuman, supra note 43, at 1965 (commenting that the “fundamental 
historical purpose” of the writ was to safeguard against unlawful executive detention, 
yet noting that the majority of scholarship concerning the writ in recent decades has 
been concerned with state court convictions). 
 144. See supra Parts I.D, II.A (observing that the DTA and MCA established that 
the only review available for the Guantanamo detainees would occur in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, while the REAL ID Act provided that review of 
alien removal orders would reside with the relevant court of appeals). 
 145. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (discussing the need for more extensive 
review of all executive detentions, not merely those involved at Guantanamo). 
 146. Id. at 2269. 
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set forth in Boumediene.147  The Court referenced leading cases 
involving judicial review of state court convictions as examples of 
appellate schemes that would provide constitutionally sufficient 
evaluation under the Boumediene analysis.148  The implication that 
Boumediene’s approach applies to all forms of habeas review is also 
indicated by the nature of the analysis itself, which the Court 
described as an “adaptable remedy.”149 
Consequently, the judicial review scheme established in the  
REAL ID Act ought to be reviewed using the Court’s analysis in 
Boumediene in order to determine the Act’s constitutionality under the 
Suspension Clause.  Under this approach, the hearings at the 
administrative level, both before an immigration judge and on appeal 
before the Board of Immigration Appeals, must be examined, as the 
Supreme Court examined the CSRTs in Boumediene,150 in order to 
determine if any issues exist that create concern in the resulting 
removal order.  The analysis should then turn to the reviewing court 
to determine whether it has the ability to correct the deficiencies 
from the earlier proceedings.151  Therefore, as the Court in 
Boumediene examined the DTA’s scope of review,152 the analysis in the 
context of alien removal orders turns to the courts of appeals, which 
have exclusive jurisdiction to review IJ and BIA decisions under the 
REAL ID Act.153  In conducting this analysis, numerous similarities 
appear between the review of alien removal orders and the 
detentions at Guantanamo.154  These similarities necessitate the same 
conclusion with regard to the REAL ID Act that the Court reached in 
                                                          
 147. See id. at 2263-69 (applying a similar analysis as that applied to the DTA and 
MCA when explaining why the Court upheld the suspension of the writ in Swain v. 
Pressley and United States v. Hayman through examining the scope of the review and 
purpose of the statute (citations omitted)). 
 148. See id. at 2264-65 (explaining that the substitute review provided for in both 
Swain and Hayman did not intend to limit review, had a much broader jurisdictional 
grant than the DTA provided, and maintained a savings clause that permitted habeas 
review if the substitute proved “inadequate or ineffective”). 
 149. See id. at 2267 (noting that the exact scope of the writ depends on the earlier 
proceedings and, therefore, will necessarily change depending on the 
circumstances). 
 150. See supra Part II.C (explaining the deficiencies in the CSRT hearings). 
 151. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing that the adequacy of 
the reviewing court must be examined in light of the circumstances of the earlier 
proceedings). 
 152. See supra Part II.C (maintaining that the jurisdictional grant to the court of 
appeals was insufficient to correct the deficiencies of the CSRTs). 
 153. See supra Part I.D (summarizing the judicial review scheme set up by the 
REAL ID Act). 
 154. See infra Parts III.B.1-2, III.C.1 (noting the similar deficiencies in the earlier 
proceedings of both systems and the inadequate level of review provided to the 
courts of appeals, which does not permit the reviewing court to correct the 
deficiencies of the earlier proceedings). 
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Boumediene in examining the DTA:  the procedures provided for in 
the REAL ID Act do not provide a constitutionally sufficient 
substitute for the writ.155 
B. Analysis of Hearings at the Administrative Level Indicates the  
Need for Extensive Review in the Federal Courts 
Applying the standards set forth in Boumediene, the analysis begins 
with the initial proceedings before both an IJ and the BIA.  These 
hearings present numerous issues similar to those of the CSRTs156 and 
create reason to question resulting removal orders.157  Both federal 
judges and commentators have criticized the immigration courts in 
recent years, not only for their procedures, but also for their 
determinations.158  As one circuit court judge stated, “the adjudication 
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.”159   
1. Hearings before an immigration judge demonstrate deficiencies in removal 
orders 
Hearings before immigration judges present issues similar to those 
the Court found troublesome in Boumediene160 and thus create 
concern about the accuracy of the resulting removal order.161  This 
concern is only more urgent considering that the consequence of 
such errors—expulsion from this country and the possible threat of 
persecution, torture, and other mistreatment in one’s native 
                                                          
 155. See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 735-36 (finding that the substitution of direct 
review in the circuit courts in the REAL ID Act has not provided an “adequate and 
effective” substitute for the writ because aliens do not have a right to introduce new 
evidence in the courts of appeals); cf. Neuman, supra note 71, at 157 (arguing that 
the complete removal of habeas review where direct review to the courts of appeals 
does not afford an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ poses serious 
problems for courts in upholding the Act). 
 156. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (describing the “risk of error” 
present in the CSRTs determinations). 
 157. See, e.g., Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the “incomprehensible” opinion of an immigration judge resulted in 
the reviewing court’s inability to determine the IJ’s factual or legal determinations). 
 158. See generally Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases,  
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1 (reporting on the various criticisms circuit court 
judges have lobbied on the immigration courts, in addition to the procedural 
changes that have occurred in recent years at the BIA). 
 159. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 160. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (noting the “considerable 
risk of error” in the CSRTs’ factual findings). 
 161. Cf. Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F. Supp. 2d 42, 85 (D. Mass. 2005) (disagreeing 
with the BIA’s removal order and recommending that the circuit court remand the 
case to the BIA, who had ordered Enwonwu’s removal, to reconsider all the 
evidence, and, if the BIA still reinstated the removal order, suggesting to the circuit 
court that his removal should be enjoined). 
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country162—is equally as serious as in Boumediene.163  Admittedly, there 
are some issues present in the CSRTs not found in the hearings 
concerning alien removal orders.164  However, the hearings on alien 
removal orders are more analogous to the CSRT hearings than 
detentions resulting from a state court proceeding.165  Both the 
CSRTs and the immigration hearings are conducted within the 
executive branch.  Additionally, in his opinion in Boumediene, Justice 
Kennedy expressed concern over various aspects of the CSRT 
hearings that limited a detainee’s ability to contest the government’s 
“assertion that he is an enemy combatant.”166  In hearings before IJs, 
an alien’s ability to contest his or her removability is similarly 
hindered.  First, as Kennedy criticized the CSRT hearings due to the 
lack of “assistance of counsel,”167 aliens similarly do not have a right to 
counsel.  Hearings concerning alien removal orders are conducted as 
civil hearings, and therefore, they do not provide a constitutional 
right to counsel,168 whereas any individual detained due to a federal 
or state court criminal conviction would have the right to counsel.169  
                                                          
 162. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 212 F. App’x 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that the petitioner, a member of the Chaldean Christian minority group in Iraq, was 
seeking withholding of his removal order based on his fear of being persecuted by 
the Ba’ath Party); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the petitioner, a citizen of Ghana, was requesting withholding of removal after 
fleeing her home where her father had made her a slave, based on the practices of 
his cultural sect); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 
2005) (describing that the petitioner, who was from an indigenous region in 
Guatemala, was seeking asylum after his family members were killed by guerrillas and 
he was arrested by soldiers, interrogated, and beaten for hours). 
 163. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (noting the risk that an 
innocent person could be detained for an indefinite period of time). 
 164. See, e.g., Anthony F. Renzo, Making a Burlesque of the Constitution:  Military 
Trials of Civilians in the War Against Terrorism, 31 VT. L. REV. 447, 540 n.442 (2007) 
(explaining that in the non-adversarial nature of CSRT hearings, because there is a 
presumption that the government’s evidence is “accurate and genuine,” the burden 
of proof on the government is only a “preponderance of the evidence,” and the 
detainee has “no access to classified evidence”). 
 165. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a) (noting the difference in 
habeas review for petitions involving immigration matters compared to that involving 
criminal convictions, in which an individual’s detention has already been subjected 
to judicial review in either state or federal proceedings). 
 166. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238 (listing various aspects of the CSRT 
procedure that caused concern, including:  the “limited means to find or present 
evidence to challenge the Government’s case”; the lack of counsel and resulting 
inability to be “aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied 
upon to order his detention”; and the difficulty posed to the detainee in questioning 
witnesses). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Victoria Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial:  Indefinite Detention of 
Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEX. L. REV. 769, 771 n.12 (2001) (explaining that 
immigrants have no right to counsel or a jury trial in their proceedings). 
 169. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (establishing that all 
individuals facing a criminal prosecution have the right to counsel under the  
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Consequently, numerous aliens proceed pro se because they do not 
have the means to pay for counsel.170  This creates additional issues, 
particularly regarding a judge’s fact-finding,171 similar to the problems 
the Court identified in Boumediene.172 
Second, hearings before IJs have received increasing criticism in 
recent years, particularly from circuit court judges who review the 
records from these hearings.173  Specifically, criticism has been 
directed at the treatment of those appearing before IJs.174  In Fiadjoe v. 
Attorney General,175 the circuit court described the IJ’s tone as “hostile 
and at times . . . extraordinarily abusive” when he addressed the alien 
seeking asylum, several times reducing her to tears when questioning 
her about her father’s sexual abuse.176  While the court of appeals in 
Fiadjoe did find a basis to remand back to the BIA,177 not all aliens are 
as fortunate.178  Ms. Fiadjoe’s experience before an IJ is hardly 
                                                          
Sixth Amendment and, if they are unable to afford one, the State, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, must appoint one). 
 170. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Jon Yates, Judges Fumble Asylum Cases:  Refugee 
Was Sent Back to Sudan to Face Jail, Beatings, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2006, at C1 (observing 
that many aliens cannot afford attorneys and subsequently do not know that they 
have a right to appeal to federal courts); see also Palmer, supra note 80, at 25 (noting 
the difficulty that detained aliens face in locating a lawyer, much less affording one). 
 171. See Nina Bernstein, New York’s Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing 
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (maintaining that “[a] judge’s fact-finding is 
much harder without a lawyer to speak for those facing deportation, who are not 
entitled to court-appointed counsel”). 
 172. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (noting the “considerable risk of error” in 
the CSRTs’ factual findings). 
 173. See, e.g., Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2005) (naming 
“disturbing features” that the circuit court had seen in the cases handled at the 
immigration court).  This listed included: a “lack of familiarity with relevant foreign 
cultures,” an “exaggerated notion of the availability, especially in poor nations, of 
documentary evidence,” “[i]nsensitivity to the possibility of misunderstandings 
caused by the use of translators of difficult languages,” “[i]nsensitivity to the difficulty 
of basing a determination of credibility on the demeanor of a person from a culture 
remote from American [sic],” and “reluctance to make clean determinations of 
credibility.”  Id.   
 174. See Liptak, supra note 158, at A1 (quoting criticism from a judge on the Third 
Circuit that “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the I.J. 
seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding”). 
 175. 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 176. See id. at 154-55 (describing the “bullying nature” of the judge’s questions 
concerning such sensitive subjects as sexual abuse and the murder of her fiancé by 
her father).  Ms. Fiadjoe, a member of the Ewe tribe in Ghana, was raised by her 
father, a Trokosi priest, who enslaved his daughter when she was seven years old and 
sexually abused her for numerous years pursuant to Trokosi rituals.  Id. at 139. 
 177. See id. at 163 (finding a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support 
the IJ’s and BIA’s holdings). 
 178. See, e.g., Dong v. Ashcroft, 139 F. App’x 325, 326 n.1, 327 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(acknowledging that the IJ and BIA decisions were not “model[s] of clarity,” but still 
denying the petition for review); cf. Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 163, 169 (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for engaging in a de novo review, which is “not 
an approach we are permitted to take as an appellate court reviewing agency action,” 
despite acknowledging Ms. Fiadjoe’s “tragic story”). 
 1636 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1611 
unique;179 numerous reports in recent years have highlighted the 
extremely troubling treatment of aliens by IJs.180  The extent of this 
criticism prompted Attorney General Gonzales to begin a review of 
all immigration courts.181  In his memorandum to the IJs, the Attorney 
General noted the “reports of immigration judges who fail to treat 
aliens appearing before them with appropriate respect and 
consideration” and that the conduct of some judges “can aptly be 
described as intemperate or even abusive.”182 
Lastly, there is concern over the quality of decisions issued by IJs.183  
In Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales,184 the Court of Appeals for the  
Ninth Circuit reviewed a “literally incomprehensible opinion by an 
immigration judge.”185  Due to the lack of any “intelligible structure,” 
                                                          
 179. See, e.g., Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Time and 
time again, [the Third Circuit has] cautioned immigration judges against making 
intemperate or humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings.  Three times 
this year [the court has] had to admonish [IJs] who failed to treat the asylum 
applicants in their court with the appropriate respect and consideration.”);  
Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the  
IJ abandoned her role as a neutral fact-finder when she “became aggressive and 
offered a stream of non-judicious and snide commentary” during the hearing and 
that her decision was “replete with sarcastic commentary and moral attacks”). 
 180. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at A1 (describing one woman’s experience 
testifying before an IJ about being forcibly sterilized in China, to which the judge 
responded by “insist[ing] that she was lying, ridicul[ing] her story and, when she 
would not recant, den[ying] her petition for asylum”); see also Ann M. Simmons,  
Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice:  Complaints of Insensitive—Even Abusive—
Conduct by Some U.S. Immigration Judges Have Prompted a Broad Federal Review,  
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18 (reporting criticism by one circuit judge concerning 
an IJ who “had failed to conduct herself as an impartial judge but rather as a 
prosecutor anxious to pick holes in the petitioner’s story” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 181. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, Attorney General, to Immigration 
Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-
010906.pdf (noting his concern with the reports that had emerged concerning some 
immigration judges and explaining that the Deputy Attorney General and Associate 
Attorney General would be conducting a “comprehensive review” of the immigration 
courts and the BIA that would examine both the “quality of work as well as the 
manner in which it is performed”). 
 182. See id. (noting the importance of the IJs’ role since they are the “face of 
American justice” to the aliens appearing before them and that, while not all will be 
granted relief, they must “be treated with courtesy and respect”).  As one court put it: 
In a country built on the dreams and accomplishments of an immigrant 
population, a particularly severe wound is inflicted on the principle that 
anyone who appears in an American courtroom is treated with dignity and 
respect when an immigration matter is not conducted in accord with the 
best of our tradition of courtesy and fairness. 
Wang, 423 F.3d at 268–69 (quoting Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 183. See Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 498 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding  
“that large parts of the opinion are incoherent”); Salim v. Keisler, 254 F. App’x 610, 
610 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that “several ambiguities” in the IJ’s decision 
“preclude proper review of [the] case”). 
 184. 400 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 185. Id. at 1187. 
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the court of appeals could not identify any factual or legal findings 
that the IJ had made.186  There is also a failure to ensure consistency 
in the decisions made by different IJs, as evinced in the Miami 
immigration court, where one judge grants asylum three percent of 
the time, while another judge in the same court grants it seventy-five 
percent of the time.187  The disparity between two judges in the same 
court who hear similar claims suggests that errors are occurring in 
the judges’ decisions to order removal.188 
These problems stem in part from the system itself, which has 
become increasingly overburdened in recent years and has a 
tremendous backlog of cases.189  However, the source of these 
problems does not change the risk of error, which presents—as the 
Court similarly found in Boumediene190—serious consequences for 
those ordered removed:  expulsion from the United States to another 
country where they could face persecution, torture, or other 
                                                          
 186. See id. at 1190 (providing numerous examples of the incomprehensibility of 
the IJ’s decision, in addition to attaching the oral transcript of the IJ’s decision to its 
own).  For example, in one sentence, the IJ stated that he found the alien credible, 
only to state in the next sentence that the “credibility issue brings many doubts have 
arisen in that as to the actual happenings and that what will happen to him if he is to 
be returned.”  Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Wide Disparities Found in Judging of Asylum Cases,  
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1 (describing the results of a study that found “vast 
differences in the handling of claims with generally comparable factual 
circumstances”). 
 188. See id. (quoting immigration lawyers who find that an alien’s likelihood of 
winning is based on luck and that there is a risk that the current system will not 
adequately provide a refuge for those aliens truly in need of one). 
 189. See id. (noting that “judges have difficult work, with huge dockets of cases that 
must be decided speedily on the basis of scant or subjective information”); see also 
Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 498 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that the 
incoherency of the IJ’s decision may be “due to antiquated recording equipment, an 
exceptionally heavy caseload, or some other reason, [but regardless] the deficiencies 
in the IJ’s opinion certainly have complicated [the court’s] review”); Bernstein,  
supra note 171, at A7 (quoting a federal judge who could not “see how immigration 
judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and 
conclusions of law under these circumstances” which are only further exacerbated by 
the lack of counsel for those facing removal (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Additionally, one recent study surveyed the immigration judges and found they faced 
a significant risk of secondary traumatic stress and burnout which could affect their 
decisions.  Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers:  Narrative Responses 
from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey,  
23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 57, 58-59 (2008).  Another recent study documented the 
numerous challenges that immigration courts face, including the politicization of the 
selection of immigration judges, the limited number of law clerks, issues with 
government attorneys, and the difficulties in ensuring accurate translations.   
See Appleseed, Assembly Line Injustice:  Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration 
Courts 8, 11, 16-18, 19-21 (2009), available at http://www.asserlaw.com/ 
articles/article_164.pdf. 
 190. See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2238 (2008) (noting the risk that an innocent person 
could be detained for an indefinite period of time). 
 1638 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1611 
mistreatment.191  Despite the risk of error resulting in serious 
consequences for aliens inaccurately ordered removed, the 
administrative appeal to the BIA does not provide aliens with 
sufficient ability to address that risk. 
2. Procedures at the Board of Immigration Appeals do not correct the 
deficiencies of the earlier proceedings 
Instead of addressing the issues presented by the IJ hearings, the 
procedure and nature of appeals at the BIA further necessitate 
extensive judicial review in the federal courts.192  The BIA has 
received similar criticism from the courts of appeals to that received 
by the IJs concerning the quality of its opinions.193  As further 
evidence of the quality of BIA decisions, Judge Posner noted that his 
court overturned BIA decisions forty percent of the time.194   
More significant, however, are the streamlining procedures that have 
been implemented at the BIA in recent years.195  Instead of ensuring 
that hearings at the administrative level provide adequate review of 
aliens’ claims, especially in light of the increasing criticism of the IJs, 
these procedures were concerned only with eliminating the backlog 
of cases at the BIA.196  This attempt to streamline has resulted in what 
many consider a failure of the BIA to adequately review IJ decisions 
because the majority of cases can be reviewed by a single judge 
without issuing an opinion.197  As Judge Posner has noted, the BIA 
“often affirm[s] either with no opinion or with a very short, 
                                                          
 191. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (describing the types of situations 
aliens may return to if ordered removed to their native country). 
 192. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 158, at A26 (describing the result of the 
streamlining processes as lacking any “meaningful” review). 
 193. See Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal 
Appellate Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at A1 (quoting a federal judge who 
described a BIA decision as “nonsensical,” “an example of sloppy adjudication,” and 
“contraven[ing] considerable precedent”); see also Kaur v. Mukasey, 270 F. App’x 
505, 507 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is impossible to tell from the BIA’s extremely cursory 
opinion in this case the legal and factual grounds for its decision.”). 
 194. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (further 
remarking that the corresponding figure for civil cases during the same time period 
in which the United States was an appellee was eighteen percent). 
 195. See supra Part I.E (discussing the various streamlining procedures 
implemented by the Attorney General, including permitting single judges to review 
almost all removal orders instead of requiring the traditional three-judge panel, 
allowing judges to issue decisions without an accompanying opinion explaining their 
decisions, and, most importantly, limiting the scope of the BIA’s review over factual 
findings made by IJs). 
 196. See Palmer, supra note 80, at 17-18 (noting that, beginning in 1999, the DOJ 
implemented various regulations to streamline the appeals process at the BIA in 
response to the increase in the BIA’s backlog in the 1990s). 
 197. See id. (explaining that the streamlining created a real failure in reviewing 
cases from IJs, particularly in checking factual findings). 
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unhelpful, boilerplate opinion even when the immigration judge 
ha[s] committed manifest errors of fact and logic.”198  Therefore, the 
courts of appeals, instead of the BIA, provide the “first meaningful 
review” over alien removal orders.199  In fact, all that the streamlining 
procedures have produced is a shift, not elimination, of the backlog 
of cases from the BIA to the courts of appeals.200 
Perhaps the most critical of the recent changes has been the 
curtailment of the BIA’s review over IJs’ factual findings.201  
Considering the criticism of the factual findings in the immigration 
courts,202 the BIA’s inability to review such decisions severely hinders 
an alien’s ability to receive an accurate decision concerning his or her 
petition to halt removal proceedings.203  Despite this elimination of 
substantive review at the BIA, several courts of appeals have upheld 
the streamlining, finding that it does not violate an alien’s due 
process rights.204  Courts have acknowledged that aliens  
“have understandable concerns about the streamlining process, 
particularly in light of the congressional limitations of federal court 
review.”205  Regardless of whether the process is constitutionally 
sufficient, Boumediene establishes that a due process analysis is never 
sufficient in determining the level of review required by the 
Suspension Clause.206  The analysis of whether the BIA provides the 
necessary review cannot end by establishing that the streamlining 
                                                          
 198. Liptak, supra note 158, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199. Id. (quoting Judge Walker, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit). 
 200. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that “[a]lthough a stated goal of the new regulations is to eliminate the BIA’s 
backlog, [the 9th Circuit observes] that the practical result may be to shift the 
backlog directly to the courts of appeal”); Preston, supra note 187, at A14 (reporting 
the surge in appeals to the circuit courts since the streamlining procedures were 
implemented). 
 201. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the BIA must now defer 
to the factual findings of the immigration judges). 
 202. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the various problems present in the 
immigration courts today). 
 203. Cf. Preston, supra note 187, at A14 (explaining that in a study of asylum cases 
from 1998 through 2005, “[a]sylum applicants . . . received favorable appeals 
decisions from the [BIA] in 43 percent of cases in 2001 . . .” but by 2005, after the 
changes had taken places, “asylum seekers . . . won their appeals in 13 percent of 
cases”). 
 204. See Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 850 (stating that it joins the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in its holding that the streamlining does not violate 
an alien’s due process).  Courts of appeals have also ruled that they do not have 
jurisdiction to review the decision to streamline in a particular case because it would 
require reviewing the IJ’s decision on the merits, over which they clearly do not have 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (noting that the inquiry into 
the sufficiency of judicial review cannot end with a due process analysis). 
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measures survive a due process test.  Especially considering that the 
BIA’s review over an IJ’s factual findings has been limited and that 
the BIA cannot engage in its own fact finding, streamlining has 
hindered the ability of the BIA to correct any errors from the earlier 
hearing.207  Therefore, despite this administrative appeal, the BIA 
does not alleviate the “risk of error,” which was most crucial to the 
Court in Boumediene in finding the need for extensive judicial 
review.208 
C. The REAL ID Act Does Not Provide Sufficient Review of  
Alien Removal Orders Despite the Issues with the Earlier Proceedings 
Under the second step in the analytical approach set forth in 
Boumediene, which examines the reviewing court to determine if it can 
correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings,209 the REAL ID Act 
fails to provide an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ.   
In light of the significant risk of error present in both the CSRT 
hearings and those before IJs and the BIA,210 the reviewing court 
under the REAL ID Act should be held to a standard similar to that 
which the Court required when examining the DTA and MCA’s 
judicial review system.211  Boumediene requires the reviewing court to 
have the means to correct the errors likely to occur in the factual 
findings of the CSRTs, including the ability to “assess the sufficiency 
of the Government’s evidence” and to introduce new exculpatory 
evidence into the record.212  Under this standard, the REAL ID Act 
also fails by not providing a means of judicial review to account for 
the failures of the previous proceedings.213 
1. The scope of review under the REAL ID Act is too limited to ensure the 
accuracy of removal orders 
Under the REAL ID Act, review by the courts of appeals is limited 
to examining the administrative records of the immigration hearings 
                                                          
 207. See supra Part I.E (providing an overview of the BIA and streamlining process 
and its effects). 
 208. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (finding a need for extensive 
judicial review in light of the risk of error in the CSRTs). 
 209. See supra Part II.B (describing the analytical approach set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene). 
 210. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (examining the proceedings before both an IJ and the 
BIA and finding several deficiencies, particularly a risk of error in removal orders). 
 211. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (discussing the 
standard of review necessary for the writ to function as an appropriate remedy). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See supra Part I.D (discussing the effects of the Real ID Act, including 
changing the standard of review for habeas proceedings). 
 2009] ACCURACY OR FAIRNESS? 1641 
and considering constitutional issues or questions of law.214  This is 
similar to the DTA’s limited review, which Kennedy found 
insufficient based on the procedures at the CSRT hearings.215  
Therefore, just as the DTA’s limited review failed to provide sufficient 
review of the CSRT hearings, the REAL ID Act has failed in 
numerous cases to provide adequate review when considering the 
problems existing at the administrative level.216 
a. The courts of appeals under the REAL ID Act have no ability to 
review the factual findings of the earlier proceedings 
In light of the similar risk of error in the earlier proceedings, the 
courts of appeals should have the ability to review the factual findings 
of the IJs and the BIA, in accordance with the Court’s requirement in 
Boumediene.217  However, in interpreting the REAL ID Act, the courts 
of appeals have made it clear that it is not their job to engage in  
fact-finding;218 instead, they are generally deprived of jurisdiction 
when the petition for review concerns disputes over the correctness 
of an IJ’s fact-finding.219  In fact, one court stated that judicial review 
is not intended to ensure an accurate decision but rather to consider 
whether the BIA made an individualized determination.220   
This position conflicts with the Court’s emphasis in Boumediene that 
judicial review should be focused on ensuring accuracy.221   
When considering the courts of appeals’ interpretation of their 
                                                          
 214. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the courts of appeals 
no longer have jurisdiction to review factual findings). 
 215. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 216. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (summarizing the issues that have arisen in recent 
years concerning hearings before IJs and the BIA for alien removal orders). 
 217. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270. 
 218. See, e.g., Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that it 
is the agency’s responsibility to make factual findings and the court’s job to review 
the administrative record). 
 219. See id. (finding that the courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over 
“questions of law,” and the REAL ID Act provides an adequate substitute to the writ 
by allowing review in the courts of appeals because the Suspension Clause does not 
require an evidentiary hearing before an Article III court).  This unequivocal 
statement that the Suspension Clause does not require evidentiary hearings is 
rebutted in Boumediene, where the Court held that evidentiary hearings will be 
required in certain circumstances.  See 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (maintaining that the court 
reviewing CSRT determinations “must have the authority to admit and consider 
relevant exculpatory evidence” (emphasis added)). 
 220. Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).  This due process 
approach to determining the scope of habeas review was rejected by the majority in 
Boumediene.  See 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy 
due process standards, it would not end our inquiry.”). 
 221. See id. at 2273 (objecting to the DTA, which it found to “disadvantage[] the 
detainee by limiting the scope of collateral review to a record that may not be 
accurate”). 
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jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act, judicial review of alien removal 
orders is not sufficiently extensive to correct factual errors made in 
the earlier proceedings.222 
The inability of the courts of appeals to sufficiently review factual 
findings is also evident when considering the level of judicial review 
the district courts possessed prior to the REAL ID Act.223  The story of 
Frank Enwonwu typifies this difference in review.224  While the case 
was before the district court, four days of evidentiary hearings were 
held and the judge used factual findings from those hearings in his 
advisory opinion recommending that Enwonwu not be removed.225  
However, the circuit court disregarded those findings and remanded 
the case back to the BIA.226  The BIA, however, was unable to consider 
the district court’s factual findings and again ordered Enwonwu’s 
removal.227 
Mohamed v. Gonzales228 also began as a habeas petition to a district 
court, but was transferred to the court of appeals upon passage of the 
REAL ID Act.229  The district court still issued an advisory opinion,230 
in which it disagreed with the BIA decision affirming the removal 
order.231  The district court objected to the failure to provide the 
petitioner with a competency hearing prior to the original hearing, 
where the alien proceeded pro se, despite clear evidence of his 
incompetency.232  The court of appeals, however, affirmed the BIA’s 
decision.233  Despite the alien’s argument that the dismissal was 
unconstitutional, the court of appeals held that the REAL ID Act did 
                                                          
 222. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (engaging 
only in a limited review of the BIA’s reinstatement of Enwonwu’s removal order by 
finding that the BIA’s review of the facts was “reasonable”). 
 223. See supra Part I.B-C (summarizing the availability of judicial review prior to 
the REAL ID Act). 
 224. See supra notes 10–28 and accompanying text (describing the story of Frank 
Enwonwu as he tried to seek judicial review over his state-created danger claim after 
serving as a government informant). 
 225. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (taking testimony 
not only from Enwonwu, but also from DEA agents who had worked with Enwonwu 
when he served as an informant for the government). 
 226. See id. at 35 (finding that there was no basis for the “state-created danger” 
claim). 
 227. See Enwonwu, 232 F. App’x at 15 (noting the inability of the BIA to consider 
the district court’s factual findings because its review is limited to the administrative 
record of the hearing before the IJ). 
 228. 477 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 229. Id. at 524. 
 230. Mohamed v. TeBrake, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Minn. 2005). 
 231. See id. at 1047 (finding that the IJ abused his discretion). 
 232. Id. at 1048-49. 
 233. See Mohamed, 477 F.3d at 528 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction 
because there was no constitutional claim or question of law). 
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not violate the Suspension Clause.234  These examples demonstrate 
the failure of the REAL ID Act to provide the level of judicial review 
required by the Court in Boumediene due to the risk of error from the 
earlier proceedings.235 
b. Petitioners are unable to present new exculpatory evidence to the courts 
of appeals 
In addition to their inability to review factual findings, the 
reviewing courts under the REAL ID Act cannot introduce 
exculpatory evidence that was not presented at the initial hearing,236 
which further limits their ability to correct the deficiencies of the 
earlier proceedings.237  Boumediene criticized the DTA for failing to 
permit the introduction of exculpatory evidence, which the Court 
found “constitutionally required” in light of the earlier 
proceedings.238  In the context of alien removal orders, considering 
that many involve asylum claims based on a fear of persecution in 
their native country, the need to evaluate the current situation in that 
country is imperative to correctly determining a petitioner’s 
qualification for relief.239  Therefore, limiting review to a potentially 
outdated administrative record cannot afford sufficient consideration 
of the alien’s claim.240 
While an alien can request that the BIA reopen the case based on 
newly available information, the decision to grant such a motion for 
                                                          
 234. See id. at 525 (finding that the Suspension Clause was not violated because an 
“adequate and effective” substitute for the writ was provided by the court, whose 
jurisdictional grant over constitutional claims and questions of law was as broad as a 
habeas petition). 
 235. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (describing the deficiencies of the earlier 
proceedings). 
 236. See Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of the 
REAL ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 582 (2008) (noting the inability of circuit courts to 
consider changed circumstances in the country where an alien is claiming 
persecution); see also id. at 566 (noting the lack of “pre-trial discovery of evidence” in 
immigration hearings that is atypical of the “American model of civil adjudication”). 
 237. See id. at 579-80 (describing the criticisms of immigration judges for “making 
mistakes in reviewing evidence proffered by a petitioner,” but noting the inability of 
circuit courts to review such mistakes). 
 238. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008) (“[W]e see no way to 
construe the statute to allow what is also constitutionally required in this context:   
an opportunity for the detainee to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was 
not made part of the record in the earlier proceedings.”). 
 239. See Reddy, supra note 236, at 582 (maintaining that a petitioner’s 
qualification for relief from removal may have changed since the BIA issued its 
decision but prior to review by a court of appeals). 
 240. See Pfenning, supra note 38, at 735-36 (arguing that the REAL ID Act 
unconstitutionally suspends the writ by not providing an “adequate and effective” 
substitute because the courts of appeals cannot admit new evidence); cf. Boumediene, 
128 S. Ct. at 2273 (criticizing the DTA for disadvantaging the “detainee by limiting 
the scope of collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or complete”). 
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reconsideration is discretionary and unappealable, providing no 
assurance that the information will be introduced.241  Additionally, as 
one circuit court has admitted, the ability to request reconsideration 
cannot be enough to satisfy the Suspension Clause because it does 
not provide judicial review.242  The detainees in Boumediene also had 
the opportunity to request a second CSRT in light of new evidence;243 
Kennedy, however, found this an “insufficient replacement for the 
factual review these detainees are entitled to receive through habeas 
corpus,” particularly considering that the decision to grant a new 
CSRT is discretionary and unchallengeable by the detainee.244  
Therefore, the ability to request reconsideration of a removal order 
cannot cure the inability of the reviewing court to introduce new 
evidence.245 
Despite this inability to review factual findings or admit new 
evidence, the courts of appeals have unanimously found that the 
REAL ID Act does not violate the Suspension Clause because the 
courts have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions 
of law.246  The courts have found such review sufficient, despite 
interpreting “questions of law” narrowly.247  While consideration of 
such issues is necessary, Boumediene requires that judicial review 
extend further to allow consideration of factual issues when there is a 
serious risk of error in the initial determination,248 as exists with alien 
removal orders.249 
2. Strict time limits place further limits on review by the courts of appeals 
In addition to limiting the scope of review, the REAL ID Act 
maintains a very stringent thirty-day time limit for the filing of 
                                                          
 241. Cf. Kirk L. Peterson, “Final” Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and 
Reconsider, and Tolling Under the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 439, 443 (1994) (noting that the only means to review 
such determinations is under an “abuse of discretion” standard). 
 242. Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 243. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2273. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding 
that Congress had provided an “adequate and effective” substitute for the writ in the 
REAL ID Act by allowing review by the courts of appeals).  In this decision, the 
Second Circuit joined the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding that the 
Suspension Clause was not violated.  Id. 
 247. See, e.g., Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(clarifying that “questions of law” is not meant to encompass all legal questions). 
 248. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (describing the deficiencies in 
the CSRT hearings that required extensive judicial review). 
 249. See supra Parts III.B.1-2 (illustrating the issues with the hearings before both 
IJs and the BIA). 
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petitions for review in the courts of appeals.250  While this time limit 
existed prior to the REAL ID Act, an alien had the ability to file for a 
writ of habeas corpus if the time limit was not met.251  Aliens face 
numerous hurdles in filing such petitions,252 notably the possibility 
that aliens will not receive notice of the BIA’s removal order in a 
timely manner,253 as in Mr. Enwonwu’s case.254  Considering these 
issues, the REAL ID Act’s time limit raises serious concerns that an 
alien will be precluded from any review.255 
This preclusion of review was evident with certain aliens who had 
been ordered removed but who had not yet filed a habeas petition 
upon passage of the REAL ID Act.256  When petitioners had a habeas 
petition pending in a district court upon passage of the Act, the 
courts of appeals granted review, even if the transfer from the district 
court occurred more than thirty days after the removal order was 
entered.257  However, those aliens who had yet to file a habeas petition 
were only given thirty days after the passage of the Act to file a 
petition for review in the relevant court of appeals.258  In one such 
case, because the alien did not file a petition within thirty days, the 
court of appeals denied his motion.259  He was, therefore, provided no 
                                                          
 250. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (noting that the REAL ID Act maintained 
the time limit from the 1996 legislation).  See generally Neuman, supra note 71, at 142 
(explaining the development of time limits for seeking review of removal orders, a 
“recent development” that did not exist in any capacity prior to 1961 and gradually 
has been reduced to its current thirty-day limit). 
 251. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (holding that habeas review was 
still available). 
 252. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (noting possible issues that could arise, 
including:  failure to receive a BIA decision, difficulties in filing while in detention, 
or failure to file due to ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing how Enwonwu never 
received notice that the dismissal of his removal order was being appealed). 
 255. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 127 (explaining that how the courts choose to 
interpret the date that the time limit begins to run will have implications for the 
availability of judicial review). 
 256. See, e.g., Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 336 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing 
the issues posed by this situation upon passage of the REAL ID Act). 
 257. See id. (noting that habeas petitions that were currently pending in the 
district courts upon passage of the REAL ID Act could be transferred to the 
appropriate court of appeals). 
 258. See id. (holding that the REAL ID Act allowed “the transfer from a district 
court to a court of appeals not only of those habeas petitions that were pending in 
the district court at the time [the Act] became law, but also those that could have 
been brought in a district court prior to [the Act’s] enactment”).  The court went on 
to note that the time limit “should not be interpreted as applying to those aliens who 
received final orders of removal prior to the enactment of [the Act], but who did not 
file a petition for review directly in a court of appeals until after the enactment of 
[the Act].”  Id. 
 259. Id. at 337 (dismissing the petition for review because the filing of it was well 
past the thirty-day limit that started when the REAL ID Act was enacted). 
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judicial review of his administrative hearing, regardless of his right to 
such review in a federal district court prior to the Act.260  The court 
argued that he was put on notice as soon as the Act was passed,261 but 
considering he had no counsel, such notice is insufficient.262   
Some circuits have taken an even harsher approach by not even 
providing thirty days from the Act’s passage to petition for review for 
those aliens who had yet to file a habeas petition prior to the Act.263 
Concerns also develop with this stringent time limit when the 
failure to comply is due to ineffective assistance of counsel.264  In one 
case, an alien ordered removed filed a motion with the BIA to reopen 
his case because his previous counsel had failed to file an appellate 
brief with the BIA and his time limit subsequently ran out.265  The BIA 
denied the motion to reopen and the alien subsequently appealed to 
the court of appeals, arguing the REAL ID Act did not provide an 
“adequate and effective” substitute for the writ due to its time limit.266  
While the court acknowledged that the time limit was considerably 
shorter than the one-year time limit under AEDPA,267 it upheld the 
REAL ID Act and found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s decision on the alien’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.268 
While it is reasonable to impose some time limit on the ability to 
seek review in the federal courts, any time limit must be examined to 
ensure that it does not effectively preclude an individual’s right to 
“adequate and effective” judicial review.269  The continuing reduction 
in the time limit for seeking review of alien removal orders has 
reached the point where the ability to seek review could, in some 
circumstances, become an “illusion.”270  While this specific issue did 
                                                          
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 337 n.9. 
 262. Cf. Morawetz, supra note 53, at 127-28 (describing the ability of the court to 
issue removal orders in absentia so long as notice has been sent out, yet stressing that 
this procedure can present the “most frightening exercise of government power” 
because there is no way to ensure that the alien received notice, and he or she will 
consequently have no way to contest removal). 
 263. See Peguero-Cruz v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 358, 361 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to 
commence the thirty-day time line from the date of the Act’s passage and finding 
that the petition was untimely since it was not filed within thirty days of the BIA’s 
decision). 
 264. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 126 (presenting the possibility that counsel 
may fail to file a timely appeal). 
 265. Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 266. Id. at 108. 
 267. Id. at 115. 
 268. Id. at 117. 
 269. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) (requiring a substitute 
for the writ to provide a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate” the “erroneous 
application or interpretation” of the law which resulted in a detention). 
 270. Neuman, supra note 71, at 142. 
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not arise in Boumediene, the analytical framework developed in the 
case indicates that the REAL ID Act does not provide an “adequate 
and effective” substitute for the writ due to the preclusive nature of 
the thirty-day time limit.271 
Any court reviewing removal orders must have an extensive scope 
of review due to the risk of error in the administrative hearings.272  
However, the REAL ID Act, particularly as interpreted by the circuit 
courts, cannot be upheld as a sufficient substitute for the writ under 
Boumediene’s analysis in light of the circuit courts’ limited scope of 
review and the stringent time limit on seeking review. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE  
CURRENT INADEQUATE REVIEW OF ALIEN REMOVAL ORDERS  
AVAILABLE UNDER THE REAL ID ACT 
Because the REAL ID Act has not created an “adequate and 
effective” substitute for the writ based on Boumediene’s test, the Act 
violates the Suspension Clause by stripping aliens of the right to seek 
habeas review and not providing a constitutionally sufficient 
substitute.  Congress and the courts, therefore, should reexamine the 
current judicial review scheme in order to provide the level of review 
required by the Constitution. 
A. A Saving Construction of the REAL ID Act Cannot Alleviate  
the Insufficient Review 
While the courts of appeals could attempt to use a saving 
construction of the REAL ID Act either to allow habeas review or to 
expand the scope of review currently employed by the courts of 
appeals, neither approach will alleviate the Suspension Clause 
concerns. 
First, based on both the language of the REAL ID Act and its 
legislative history, it appears impossible to interpret the Act in a way 
that would permit habeas review, as the Court in St. Cyr was able to 
do.273  The Court in St. Cyr made clear that in order to find a repeal of 
habeas review, Congress would have to provide a “clear, 
unambiguous, and express statement” of that intent,274 which 
                                                          
 271. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s 
findings in Boumediene concerning the deficiencies in the CSRTs, which the Court 
held required extensive judicial review). 
 272. Cf. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (concluding that even when all parties to a 
proceeding act in good faith there is still a considerable risk of error in fact-finding). 
 273. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001) (finding that Congress did not 
explicitly dictate its intent to repeal habeas review). 
 274. Id. 
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Congress has done in the REAL ID Act.  The language of the Act 
establishes that review in the courts of appeals will be the “sole and 
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.”275  
Congress also clarified its intent to eliminate habeas review through 
its Conference Report for the Act.276  Therefore, any attempt by the 
courts to read the Act as allowing habeas review would be contrary to 
congressional intent. 
Additionally, any attempt by the courts to read broadly the scope of 
review granted in the Act would still not satisfy the Suspension Clause 
under the Court’s analysis in Boumediene.  Under the Boumediene 
analysis, it was essential for the court reviewing the CSRTs to have the 
ability to correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings, 
particularly any errors in fact-finding.277  Because there is a similar 
concern regarding the accuracy of alien removal orders,278 any 
extension in the scope of the circuit courts’ review would not address 
that concern due to the courts of appeals’ inability to consider new 
evidence  and make factual findings.279 
B. Habeas Review Should Be Restored to Provide a Safeguard  
When Direct Review Proves Inadequate or Ineffective 
Since it is not possible to construe the REAL ID Act in a manner 
that would comport with the Suspension Clause, Congress must 
restore some form of habeas review or the courts should find the Act 
in violation of the Suspension Clause.  As mentioned in Boumediene, 
Congress could satisfy the Suspension Clause by inserting a savings 
clause that would permit habeas review in the district courts if the 
                                                          
 275. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 276. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173-74 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 298-99 (noting, first, that the intent of the 1996 acts was to 
eliminate habeas review, which the Court disregarded in its St. Cyr decision; second, 
that the system created by the St. Cyr decision has created anomalies and confusion; 
and third, section 106 of the REAL ID Act solves the problems created in St. Cyr 
because it eliminates the bifurcated system of review in both the district courts and 
courts of appeals by only permitting review in the circuit courts). 
 277. See supra Part II.B-C (observing that “adequate and effective” review must 
include the ability to correct the deficiencies of the earlier proceedings, which the 
DTA did not permit because the court of appeals could not make factual findings). 
 278. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (describing the deficiencies of the hearings before IJs 
and the BIA). 
 279. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?:  The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas 
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2007–08 (1992) (commenting 
that an essential aspect of review under a petition for habeas corpus is the ability of 
the district courts to “hear evidence themselves,” whereas the courts of appeals or the 
Supreme Court hearing claims on direct appeal must remand to either the 
administrative courts or the state courts for additional evidence to be gathered). 
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review in the courts of appeals proved inadequate or ineffective.280  
This approach would largely restore judicial review of alien removal 
orders to the system established by the 1961 amendments to the INA, 
which existed until 1996.281  Under the 1961 system, while the courts 
of appeals would have primary jurisdiction to review removal orders, 
habeas review would be preserved for unusual cases where direct 
review proved inadequate or ineffective.282  In this way, direct review 
could still be used for those cases where the circuit courts have 
adequate jurisdiction to correct any deficiencies from the earlier 
proceedings.283  A savings clause would, however, preserve the right to 
judicial review for those individuals for whom direct review is not 
sufficient.284 
If direct review is preserved as the primary means of judicial review, 
Congress would need to alter the time limit on filing for review in the 
courts of appeals.  In the 1961 amendments, most aliens had ninety 
days to file for review,285 compared to the thirty days allowed under 
the REAL ID Act.286  Such a stringent time limit can preclude all 
review287 and, therefore, cannot satisfy Boumediene’s test for “adequate 
and effective” review when habeas review is limited to unusual 
circumstances. 
While it might appear difficult to create an “adequate and 
effective” substitute for the writ after Boumediene, this limited ability to 
suspend the writ would be consistent with the history of the writ in 
                                                          
 280. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (noting that even in the state 
court conviction context, both statutes maintained a savings clause to permit habeas 
review). 
 281. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (explaining the previous system 
of review, which provided for primary jurisdiction to reside with the courts of appeals 
but permitted habeas review in unusual circumstances or when an alien was subject 
to removal and simultaneously detained). 
 282. See Morawetz, supra note 53, at 117 (describing habeas review as a 
“backstop”). 
 283. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the Fiadjoe case, in 
which the circuit court had sufficient jurisdiction to address the deficiencies from the 
earlier proceedings). 
 284. See, e.g., Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 F. App’x 11, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(revealing the failings of direct review and exemplifying a situation in which judicial 
review is necessary to correct the BIA’s erroneous conclusion). 
 285. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the 
1961 INA). 
 286. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (acknowledging the time limits 
imposed by the REAL ID Act, which maintained those previously established in the 
1996 acts). 
 287. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (explaining that the reduction in 
the time allowed to petition for review can be reduced to the point where judicial 
review is an “illusion”). 
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the United States.288  As the Court in Boumediene stressed, the writ of 
habeas corpus has not been suspended often in this country’s history, 
indicating the “care Congress has taken . . . to preserve the writ and 
its function.”289  The drafters of the Suspension Clause also 
considered the writ to have a “pre-eminent role” in the United States’ 
constitutional system,290 and only permitted its suspension in two 
limited circumstances.291  The Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
ability of Congress to suspend the writ so long as an “adequate and 
effective” substitute is provided.292  Boumediene makes clear for the first 
time the stringent nature of the test for determining an “adequate 
and effective” substitute, ensuring that the suspension of the  
“Great Writ” will not occur with any frequency.293 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time, Boumediene v. Bush established a test for 
determining whether a substitute for the writ of habeas corpus is 
“adequate and effective” for the purpose of upholding the 
Suspension Clause.  In order to establish the constitutionality of a 
substitute, earlier proceedings must first be examined for any 
deficiencies that create cause for concern in the resulting 
determination.  Upon determining the existence of any deficiencies, 
the reviewing court’s authority must then be examined to determine 
if it can properly address the deficiencies from the earlier 
proceedings. 
Applying this test to the current system of review for alien removal 
orders, the elimination of the right to habeas review under the REAL 
ID Act violates the Suspension Clause.  When considering the 
procedures both at the immigration courts and the BIA, in addition 
to the issues concerning the conduct of those cases, there is cause for 
concern regarding the accuracy of the removal orders, as the Court 
similarly found in Boumediene with the CSRTs.  In light of this 
concern, the courts of appeals’ permitted level of review over the IJs 
                                                          
 288. See supra Part I.A (noting the importance placed on the writ throughout the 
history of the United States). 
 289. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2263 (2008) (finding that most 
legislative acts concerning the writ have actually expanded its scope rather than 
suspended it). 
 290. GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 104.04(2)(a). 
 291. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting the writ to be suspended in the 
event of a “[r]ebellion or [i]nvasion”). 
 292. E.g. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205, 223 (1952). 
 293. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that the writ of 
habeas corpus is also called the “Great Writ”). 
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and BIA’s decisions does not provide sufficiently extensive review, 
particularly due to the limited jurisdictional grant and the stringent 
time limit for filing for review.  Because the courts of appeals would 
be unable to conduct evidentiary hearings and make factual findings, 
it is unlikely that even the broadest possible grant to the courts of 
appeals would satisfy the Suspension Clause.  Instead, the surest way 
of providing constitutionally adequate review would be to restore 
aliens’ right to seek habeas review in the federal district courts.  
While direct review to the courts of appeal can be maintained as the 
primary means of judicial review for removal orders, habeas review 
must be reinstated as a safeguard for those unique cases, such as 
Frank Enwonwu’s, for whom direct review proves inadequate and 
ineffective. 
Boumediene has refocused the use of the writ to providing 
protections that go beyond assurances of fair procedure, as the 
legislative changes in recent years concerning alien removal orders 
have erred in doing.  The writ must be administered in a way that will 
reach and correct injustices that have occurred.  Stories such as Frank 
Enwonwu’s demonstrate the grave risks presented when Congress 
and the courts fail to apply the writ to its fullest capacity.   
The implications of Boumediene do not end here, however, but rather 
reach to all uses of the writ.  The impact on alien removal orders is, 
unfortunately, but one example of the curtailment of habeas 
protections in recent years. 
